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Charter Standards for Investigative
Powers: Have the Courts Got the
Balance Right?
Don Stuart*

I. INTRODUCTION
The entrenchment of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1
rights for accused in 1982 with effective remedies for breach has indeed
had a revolutionary effect on the criminal justice system. Our criminal
justice system is no longer just about whether guilt has been proved.
Courts also insist on maintaining fundamental Charter standards of fairness
respecting policing, prosecution, trials, sentencing and release from
custody. The judicial assertion of entrenched Charter standards since 1982
has constituted the only real check against the lure of law-and-order
politics by politicians of all stripes and the consequent unremittingly
legislative trend to toughen the criminal law. There are no votes in being
soft on crime. Politicians fall over each other to be tough even though
criminologists have made it very clear that toughening penalties in the
United States and elsewhere has had no effect on reducing crime.2 The
Charter has helped ensure that we have a balanced criminal justice system
of which Canadians should be proud. It protects minority rights against
the tyranny of the majority. This include rights of those accused of crime,
which tend to be unpopular until the moment you get charged.
This paper seeks to state the basic minimum Charter standards put
in place for police powers to stop, detain and question and then to
consider whether the courts have arrived at the proper balance between
*
Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. Many of the views expressed in this article first
appeared in comments in the Criminal Reports and in my Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law
(4th ed., 2005), both Carswell/Thomson publications.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
Tony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null
Hypothesis” in Michael Tonry, ed., Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 31 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003), at 143-95.
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affording police effective enforcement powers while protecting the civil
rights of all Canadians. Have the standards been set too low or too high?
This will require consideration of minimum standards under sections 7,
8, 9 and 10, the voluntary confession rule and of the usual remedy of
exclusion of evidence under section 24(2). In each case I will seek to set
out the current standards and then assess strengths and weaknesses.
I will be guided by what Dickson C.J.C. once said in a visit to Queen’s
University. He indicated that academics were excellent critics but not as
good at constructive suggestions for future development of the law.

II. POWER TO SEARCH
1. General Section 8 Standards
Section 8 protects against unreasonable search or seizure. Where there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Charter requires that the search
be authorized by law, based on credibly based probabilities not mere
suspicion, pre-authorized by warrant where feasible and with the warrant
issued on oath by one capable of acting judicially, and that the search be
conducted in a reasonable manner.
These standards were mostly put in place as early as 1984 through
the visionary, purposeful approach undertaken to the Charter generally,
and section 8 in particular, by Dickson C.J.C. for the Supreme Court in
Hunter v. Southam.3
2. Weakening Trigger of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In Hunter v. Southam,4 the Court stressed that section 8 protects
people, not places, and that the privacy interests to be protected are wider
than trespass. It was recognized that a reasonable expectation of privacy
would sometimes give way to the interests of law enforcement and security
of the State. Reasonable expectation of privacy thus became the trigger
for section 8 protection. Where there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy, there is no section 8 Charter protection at all.

3

Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. See, too,
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
4
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
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At first, the Supreme Court stuck to its guns. In Wong,5 the police
used a hidden camera to conduct surveillance of a hotel room rented by
the accused to conduct illegal gambling. Justice La Forest decided for
the majority that there had been a reasonable expectation of privacy and
that the warrantless search breached section 8. He emphasized that the
question of reasonable expectation of privacy had to be asked in a neutral
way and that the illegality of the conduct was irrelevant:
[I]t would be an error to suppose that the question that must be asked
in these circumstances is whether persons who engage in illegal activity
behind the locked door of a hotel room have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Rather, the question must be framed in broad and neutral
terms so as to become whether in a society such as ours persons who
retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.6

Subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of reasonable expectation
of privacy have substantially, and without persuasive justification, much
reduced the ambit of section 8 protection.
The rot really set in with Edwards.7 The majority relied on the very
brief two-page reasons of a U.S. federal court in Gomez,8 a minor case
involving the stop and search of a stolen vehicle, to hold that there
should be a totality of circumstances approach in which the following
were factors that could be considered:
(1) presence at the time of the search;
(2) possession or control of the property or place searched;
(3) ownership of the property or place;
(4) historical use of the property and place;
(5) the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude
others from the place;
(6) the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and
(7) the objective reasonableness of the expectation.9

5
6
7
8
9

R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 50 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.).
U.S. v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254 (8th Cir. 1994).
U.S. v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, at 256 (8th Cir. 1994).
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This placed the emphasis on property interests contrary to Hunter v.
Southam.10 Edwards was held by the majority, over the vehement dissent
of La Forest J., to have had no reasonable expectation of privacy respecting
a police search of his girlfriend’s apartment although he occasionally stayed
over and had keys. Edwards11 led to the majority ruling in Belnavis12 that
a passenger in a vehicle normally has no reasonable expectation of privacy
to even advance a section 8 claim.
Then the Court decided that the full Hunter v. Southam13 standards
could not be applied to regulatory offences. This assumes that there is a
satisfactory distinction between what is regulatory and what is criminal,
and also leaves uncertain the extent to which the Hunter standards can
be reduced. Fortunately the Supreme Court in Jarvis (2002),14 a case of
income tax evasion contrary to the Income Tax Act,15 brought some
clarity and a partial return to Hunter. The Court held that an inquiry by a
tax auditor “crossed the Rubicon” when the predominant purpose became
that of a prosecution. From that point, the full Hunter protections are to be
applied.16
In the case of school searches, the Supreme Court compromised. In
M. (M.R.),17 school children were held to have a reduced expectation of
privacy such that standards for school searches could be reduced to
reasonable suspicion and reasonable manner and there was to be no warrant
requirement.
A further significant threat to the ambit of section 8 protection came
with the decision of the Court in Tessling (2005).18 Justice Binnie, speaking
for a unanimous Court of seven justices,19 decided that the use of Forward
Looking Infra-Red (“FLIR”) technology from an airplane to detect heat
emanations from a private home did not violate section 8 as the accused
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. According
to Binnie J., few things are more important to our way of life as the
10

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.).
12
R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.).
13
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
14
R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, 6 C.R. (6th) 23 (S.C.C.).
15
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).
16
See, further, Davis Stratas, “‘Crossing the Rubicon’: The Surpreme Court and Regulatory
Investigations” (2003) 6 C.R. (6th) 74.
17
R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.).
18
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.).
19
McLachlin C.J.C., Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, and Fish JJ. concurred. Justices
Iacobucci and Arbour, who had both recently resigned from the Court, took no part in the judgment.
11
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amount of power allowed the police to invade the homes, privacy and
even the bodily integrity of members of Canadian society without judicial
authorization. At the same time, social and economic life creates competing
demands. The community wants privacy but it also insists on protection.
Safety, security and the suppression of crime are legitimate countervailing
concerns. Thus section 8 of the Charter accepted, held Binnie J., the
validity of reasonable searches and seizures. It is only if the police
activity invades a reasonable expectation of privacy that the activity is
a search. The Court saw section 8 as protecting a number of privacy
interests, including personal, territorial and informational interests. Privacy,
however, was a “protean concept”, and the difficult issue was where the
“reasonableness” line should be drawn. Whereas Abella J.A., then of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in the Court below, treated the FLIR imaging
as equivalent to a search of the home, and thus “worthy of the state’s
highest respect”,20 it was more accurately characterized as an external
surveillance of the home to obtain information that may or may not be
capable of giving rise to an inference about what was actually going on
inside, depending on what other information is available to the police.
The reasonableness line had to be determined by looking at the
information generated by existing FLIR technology, and then evaluating
its impact on a reasonable privacy interest. Surface emanations detected by
present FLIR technology are, on their own, meaningless. The technology
was seen to be presently non-intrusive in its operation and mundane in
the data it was capable of producing. Although the information about the
distribution of the heat was not visible to the naked eye, the FLIR heat
profile did not touch on a biographical core of personal information, nor
did it tend to reveal intimate details of lifestyle. Its disclosure scarcely
affected dignity, integrity and autonomy.
The Supreme Court has clearly resolved that police use of existing
FLIR technology does not offend section 8 of the Charter. The Court
distances Canada from the decision of Scalia J. for the United States
Supreme Court in Kyllo v. U.S. (2000)21 that FLIR imaging of the outside
of houses is unconstitutional. Our highest Court does expressly enter two
caveats:
(1) FLIR information alone is insufficient ground to obtain a search
warrant; and
20
21

R. v. Tessling, [2003] O.J. No. 186, at para. 33 (Ont. C.A.).
533 U.S. 27 (2000).
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(2) If, as the Court expects, FLIR technology gets better, the constitutional
issue will have to be reconsidered.
What of aerial surveillance using binoculars? Such a search for a
marijuana grow operation on suspicion has been held by the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal to violate section 8.22 Is that different because
that method is more intrusive? The Court in Tessling23 recognizes its
earlier ruling in Kokesch (1990)24 where the Court decided it was a serious
breach of section 8 for a police officer to walk up a driveway without a
warrant to check from the outside as to a possible grow operation. Tessling
rests uneasily with Kokesch. It is difficult to understand how flying over
a house with FLIR technology is constitutional whereas walking up the
driveway and feeling the wall for heat is not.
Overall the ruling in Tessling25 appears to tilt section 8 principles
markedly in favour of the interests of law enforcement rather than
protecting privacy. The Court says there was no search because there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is one thing to decide there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no section 8 protection
engaged. To go further and deny that there was a search would be hard
to justify to a house owner watching a police helicopter flying overhead
with FLIR technology, however crude.
The Court’s focus on the reasonableness of the search allows it to
bypass the fundamental warrant requirement put in place by Hunter v.
Southam26 and asserted by Abella J.A. in the Court below.
Justice Binnie speaks of “perhaps a long spiritual journey” from
famous pronouncements protecting one’s home from the power of the
King to the accused’s attempt to shelter a marijuana grow operation.27
This remark undercuts the key pronouncement in Wong28 as to the
importance of asking the question in a neutral way. Here the question
should not have been whether grow operators have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, but whether occupants of houses have a

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

R. v. Kelly, [1999] N.B.J. No. 98, 22 C.R. (5th) 248 (N.B.C.A.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Kokesch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 117, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.).
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reasonable expectation of privacy from police inspection conducted by
aircraft using technology devices.29
Disturbingly, many lower courts have seized on Tessling30 to hold
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy against police use of
dog sniffers. The Ontario Court of Appeal31 did reject the analogy between
police use of rudimentary FLIR technology and dog sniffers in holding
that a random dog sniff search of an entire school violated section 8.
However, the Courts of Appeal of Alberta32 and Newfoundland33 applied
Tessling to hold that youth getting off public buses in those provinces
subjected to police dog sniffers have no reasonable expectation of privacy
and cannot raise section 8 protections. Those random searches are part
of the RCMP’s Operation Pipeline, which was imported from the United
States and is controversial for its deliberate use of racial profiling.34 The
Canadian version was first justified as a preventive tool against terrorism
but it is clearly now an excuse to go after youth with marijuana on buses.
The dog sniff issue is on reserve in the Supreme Court. Hopefully
the Supreme Court will decide that section 8 must be applied to police
use of dog sniffers and, in the course of that ruling, it will adjust its
approach in Tessling.35 There is a mountain of case law on the issue of
whether a smell of marijuana can constitute reasonable grounds for a
search to comply with section 8. It would be odd were the courts to hold
that all the police need to avoid the reasonable ground, warrant, reasonable
manner and other requirements in drug searches is to bring along a dog.

29
For further critical comments on Tessling, see Renee Pomerance, “Shedding Light on
the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in the Wake of R. v. Tessling” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 229; Steve
Coughlan & Marc Gorbet, “Nothing Plus Nothing Equals . . . Something? A Proposal for FLIR Warrants
on Reasonable Suspicion” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 239; and James Stringham, “Reasonable Expectations
Revisited: A Return to the Search for a Normative Core for Section 8?” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 245.
For a more supportive view, see Arthur J. Cockfield, “Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the
Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies” (2007) 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 41.
30
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.).
31
R. v. M. (A.), [2006] O.J. No. 1663, 37 C.R. (6th) 372 (Ont. C.A.).
32
R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 39 C.R. (6th) 282 (Alta C.A.).
33
R. v. Taylor, [2006] N.J. No. 218, 40 C.R. (6th) 21 (N.L.C.A.).
34
See David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2006), at 91-94.
35
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). See, too, Steve Coughlan,
“Privacy Goes to the Dogs” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 31; Jonathan Shapiro, “Narcotics Dogs and the
Search for Illegality: American Law in Canadian Courts” (2007) 43 C.R. (6th) 299; Ian Kerr & Jena
McGill, “Emanations, Snoop Dogs and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 392;
and Sherri Davis-Barron, “The Lawful Use of Drug Detector Dogs” (2007) 52 Crim L.Q. 345.
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Any balancing of interests should be done under those requirements and
not pre-empted by a narrow interpretation of the triggering device.36
There are grounds for distinction of places such as airports where it
is widely accepted that there is a much diminished expectation of privacy.
Even in that context, Courts of Appeal37 have thus far found that searches of
luggage engage section 8 scrutiny, although the trend is not to exclude for
breaches given the reduced expectation of privacy.
Searches of luggage in bus stations is a situation where more privacy
can reasonably be expected. The Supreme Court decision in Buhay38 is
authority for the view that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
lockers at a bus station even where the owners of the station have a key.
Buhay was expressly relied on by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Dinh39
in its holding that a dog sniff search without reasonable grounds of a
locker in a bus depot was a serious violation of section 8 which should
result in exclusion. However the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal
later decided Dinh had to be reversed given Tessling.40
Another area in which the dangers of Tessling41 are evident is the
issue of police use of digital recorder ammeters (DRA meters). This
device can be attached to the electric supply going into a residence and
measures amount going in and the timing of use. In Le,42 Fradsham J. of the
Alberta Provincial Court decided that the warrantless installation of a DRA
meter violated section 8. It was used to produce presumptive patterns of
marijuana grow operations and produced invariably reliable information.
It might reveal intimate details of lifestyle and personal choices and was
quite unlike the rudimentary heat emanations outside a house revealed
by crude FLIR technology. This carefully considered judgment was
followed by a Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench judge who was,
however, reversed by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 43 To that
Court of Appeal the fact that the evidence was more probative than in
Tessling made no difference. This evidence revealed very little about
core biographical details, lifestyle or private decisions.
36

See, too, Steve Coughlan, “Privacy Goes to the Dogs” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 31.
R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 13 C.R. (5th) 34 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Truong, [2002]
B.C.J. No. 1067, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 132 (B.C.C.A.).
38
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
39
R. v. Lam, [2003] A.J. No. 811, 11 C.R. (6th) 58 (Alta. C.A.).
40
R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 39 C.R. (6th) 282 (Alta. C.A.).
41
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.).
42
R. v. Le, [2005] A.J. No. 338, 30 C.R. (6th) 124 (Alta. Q.B.).
43
R. v. Cheung, [2007] S.J. No. 187, 219 C.C.C. (3d) 414 (Sask. C.A.), revg [2005] S.J.
No. 474, 199 C.C.C. (3d) 260 (Sask. Q.B.).
37
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Professor Stephen Coughlan perceptively points out there will be
much less section 8 protection if courts continue to categorize matters as
informational privacy rather than the traditionally highly protected
categories of personal and territorial privacy:
Essentially any piece of evidence can be recast as a piece of information:
the amount of heat in one’s home ... undetectable odour from inside
a piece of luggage ...; the percentage of alcohol in one’s system and
therefore whether one is impaired, and so on. When there are three
categories of privacy, one is much less protected than the other two,
and almost anything can be placed into that category, privacy protection
is significantly impaired.44

Section 8 protection has been substantially diminished by the Court’s
pro-State interpretations of reasonable expectation of privacy. There
ought to be a reconsideration and a return to the wide protection of privacy
interests afforded in Hunter v. Southam.45
3. Acceptance of Ancillary Powers Doctrine
Chief Justice Dickson was at pains in Hunter v. Southam46 to declare
that the Courts were “the guardians of the Constitution”47 and that the
Charter “is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent
with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for
governmental action”.48
Collins49 confirmed that an illegal search was necessarily a violation
of section 8. Yet various majorities of the Supreme Court have, ever
since the majority Dedman decison50 that RIDE stop programs could be
authorized by the courts without enabling legislation, done an end run
around that by using the so-called ancillary powers doctrine derived from
the English decision in Waterfield51 to create a number of new police
powers.

44

Annotation to R. v. LaChappelle, [2007] O.J. No. 3613 (Ont. C.A.).
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
46
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
47
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 169 (S.C.C).
48
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156 (S.C.C.).
49
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
50
R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). Dickson C.J.C. registered
a strong dissent, expressing concerns about the rule of law and the supremacy of Parliament.
51
R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (Ct. Crim. App.).
45
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The latest statement of the ancillary powers doctrine was by Abella
J. for a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court in Clayton.52 She adopted the
following statement of Doherty J.A. in the Court below:53
Where the prosecution relies on the ancillary power doctrine to
justify police conduct that interferes with individual liberties, a twopronged case specific inquiry must be made. First, the prosecution
must demonstrate that the police were acting in the exercise of a lawful
duty when they engaged in the conduct in issue. Second, and in addition
to showing that the police were acting in the course of their duty, the
prosecution must demonstrate that the impugned conduct amounted to
a justifiable use of police powers associated with that duty. 54

The key issue is almost always that of the second test of justifiability
which, according to Dedman55 is that of “reasonably necessary” given the
liberty interest involved.
Many writers56 argue that the problem with the ancillary powers
doctrine is that it is a fact-specific ex post facto inquiry that is vague and
speculative and contrary to the rule of law. It should be left to Parliament
to allow for full democratic processes to come up with clear, prospective
and comprehensive rules that will serve to confine and structure the
exercise of police discretion.57

52

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Clayton, [2005] O.J. No. 1078, 27 C.R. (6th) 197 (Ont. C.A.).
54
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).
55
R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).
56
See most recently Stephen Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law:
Annotation to R. v. Clayton” (2007) 47 C.R. (6th) 266 and James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of
Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299.
Respecting investigative detention, see also Eric Gottardi, “R. v. Mann: Regulating State Intrusions
in the Context of Investigative Detentions” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 27; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a
Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; David Tanovich, “The Colourless World of
Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R.
(6th) 58; Lesley McCoy, “Some Answers from the Supreme Court on Investigative Detention . . .
And Some More Questions” (2004) 49 Crim. L.Q. 268; Alec Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause —
Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327; and Christina Skibinsky,
“Regulating Mann in Canada” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 197. See earlier Stephen Coughlan, “Search
Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with Caution or Full Stop?” (2003) 2 C.R. (6th) 49; James
Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta.
L. Rev 335; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004)
41 Alta. L. Rev. 935; Patrick Healey, “Investigative Detention in Canada” (2005) Crim. L.R. 98;
and James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter”
(2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1.
57
James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative
Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 326.
53
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Both citizens and the police officer need to know what State powers
are in advance. Yes, but what of Parliament’s inaction on the many
clarifying police powers recommendations of the Law Reform Commission
of Canada in the 1980s? And what of Parliament’s record of the past 15
years of almost always favouring arguments of law-and-order expediency
and listening to like-minded lobby groups ― in this context those of
police and prosecutors? The Parliamentary record ought also to be
subjected to rigorous critical scrutiny. There is now a significant body of
case law since the Charter to suggest that our independent judges in
applying the ancillary powers doctrine do a better job than Parliament in
their role as “guardians of the constitution” in balancing minority rights
of accused against the interests of law enforcement and public safety.58
This reality has caused me to change flags on this issue.
Consider the issue of strip searches. In its blockbuster ruling in Golden
(2001),59 Iacobucci and Arbour JJ.60 for a 5-4 majority of the Supreme
Court dramatically declared several new Charter standards for strip
searches incidental to lawful arrest. They declared a number of new
minimum standards for strip searches conducted incident to lawful arrest:
•

They cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy.

•

They cannot be carried out abusively or for the purpose of humiliating
or punishing the arrestee.

•

Police must have reasonable and probable grounds to justify a strip
search.

•

They must be conducted in a reasonable manner.

•

They should be conducted at the police station except where there is
a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for weapons or objects
that could be used to threaten the safety of the accused, the arresting
officers or other individuals.

58
The debate is now water under a fast-flowing bridge. Justice Binnie in R. v. Clayton,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.), says “[w]hether Waterfield was or was not a sound
basis for the majority view in Dedman may still be a matter of historical and academic interest, but
I take the law established by the majority in Dedman as my point of departure” (at para. 77).
59
R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 47 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.). This review of Golden was
first published in the Criminal Reports and in revised form in Don Stuart, “Zigzags on Right of
Accused: Brittle Majorities Manipulate Weasel Words of Dialogue, Deference and Charter Values”
(2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 267, at 268-74.
60
Justices Major, Binnie and LeBel concurred.
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The majority nevertheless suggested61 that legislative intervention
could be an important addition to the guidance the Court was setting out.
Clear legislative prescription as to when and how strip searches should
be conducted would be of assistance to the police and to the courts. In
the meantime, the following questions, which drew upon the common
law principles as well as the statutory requirements set out in English
legislation, would provide a framework for the police in deciding how
best to conduct a strip search incident to arrest in compliance with the
Charter:
(1) Can the strip search be conducted at the police station and, if not,
why not?
(2) Will the strip search be conducted in a manner that ensures the
health and safety of all involved?
(3) Will the strip search be authorized by a police officer acting in a
supervisory capacity?
(4) Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying out the strip
search are of the same gender as the individual being searched?
(5) Will the number of police officers involved in the search be no
more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances?
(6) What is the minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search?
(7) Will the strip search be carried out in a private area such that no
one other than the individuals engaged in the search can observe
the search?
(8) Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as possible and in a
way that ensures that the person is not completely undressed at
any one time?
(9) Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection of the arrestee’s
genital and anal areas without any physical contact?
(10) If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a weapon or evidence
in a body cavity (not including the mouth), will the detainee be
given the option of removing the object himself or of having the
object removed by a trained medical professional?

61

R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 47 C.R. (5th) 1, at para. 103 (S.C.C.).
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(11) Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and the manner in
which the strip search was conducted?62

Justice Bastarache authored the dissenting opinion of four justices.63
He expressed profound disagreement with these new standards. The
majority were wrong to require police to prove that they had reasonable
and probable grounds to justify a strip search. The existing common law
rule that police demonstrate an objectively valid reason for the arrest
rather than for the search was consistent with section 8 of the Charter,
provided that the strip search was for a valid objective and not conducted
in an abusive fashion. According to Bastarache J., the discovery of
evidence should not be postponed to a time where the search can take
place at a police station. The fear that evidence may be destroyed or lost
before arriving at the police station was genuine. Police officers are not
always close to a station; they operate in remote areas and are often alone.
In the view of the minority, the proposed rule that all strip searches
proceed at a police station absent exigent circumstances should be left to
Parliament. Furthermore, by stating that exigent circumstances will only
exist where there is a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for
weapons or objects that could be used to threaten safety, the majority
had abolished the right to search for evidence upon arrest. In doing so,
they had drawn an unprecedented and unworkable distinction between
the objective of discovering and preserving evidence and the objective
of searching for weapons.
According to Bastarache J., the majority were “excessive to adopt
foreign legislation”.64 Disagreement was also expressed with the majority’s
view of the need for authorization by a senior officer, and the emphasis
on the unilateral decision of officers, the danger to health and safety and
the failure of the police to give the accused the opportunity to remove
his own clothing.
There is certainly room for debate65 as to whether the majority went
too far in setting out Charter standards for strip searches. Some of the
Court’s pronouncements, such as the need for authorization by a superior
officer, may be impractical in remote areas, as Bastarache J. suggests.
However Bastarache J. shows little respect for the Court’s role as
62

R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 47 C.R. (5th) 1, at para. 101 (S.C.C.).
Chief Justice McLachlin and Gonthier J. concurred. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé delivered a
short concurring opinion.
64
R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 47 C.R. (5th) 1, at para. 8 (S.C.C.).
65
See further Eric V. Gottardi, “The Golden Rules: Raising the Bar Regarding Strip Searches
Incident to Arrest” (2002) 47 C.R. (5th) 48.
63
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“[guardian] of the Constitution”66 in suggesting that standards for strip
searches be left for Parliament. This takes deference to a new level
which does little to validate entrenched Charter rights. Strip searches are
highly intrusive and had become very much part of the landscape of the
Canadian criminal justice system. Parliament had chosen not to intervene
despite recommendation from the Law Reform Commission as early as
1985.67 This is typical of the ever-increasing law-and-order slant of
politicians of all stripes who see few votes in being soft on crime and
amending the law to favour accused. It was high time for the Supreme
Court to assert section 8 standards. It is not clear why it was improper
for the majority to have developed its standards by looking to other
jurisdictions, whether this law was found in court decisions or legislative
enactment.
Another example where the courts have shown a balanced approach
that may well have been too pro-accused for Parliament is in the judicial
use of the ancillary powers doctrine to create investigative detention
and, now, roadblock stop powers. In declaring these powers, which are
assessed in the next section, the majority of the Court has very carefully
limited incidental search powers to situations of officer safety rather than
searching for evidence.
So, too, in Godoy,68 while authorizing emergency powers to enter to
investigate disconnected 911 calls, the Court refused to authorize relaxation
of section 8 search standards.

III. POWER TO DETAIN
1. General Section 9 and Section 10(a) Standards
Under section 9, any arrest, detention or imprisonment must not be
arbitrary. Arbitrary means without criteria for discretion, 69 capricious,
without lawful authority70 and without justification.71 Where a person is

66

Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 169 (S.C.C.).
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Obtaining Forensic Evidence: Investigative
Procedures in Respect of the Person (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985).
68
R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.).
69
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ladouceur,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.).
70
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
71
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
67
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arrested or detained, section 10(a) requires that the person be informed
without delay of the reason for the arrest.
2. Psychological Detention
What is the meaning of “detention” for section 9 and section 10(b)
purposes? Justice Iacobucci in Mann (2004)72 remarked73 that police
cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of
the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or
even interview. The Court noted that a person stopped will in all cases
be “detained” in the sense of “delayed” or “kept waiting”. Justice
Iacobucci observed that the constitutional rights recognized by sections
9 and 10 of the Charter were not engaged by delays that involve no
significant physical or psychological restraint.
This test of degree is too uncertain and also misses the civil liberty
concerns about general stop powers. The Supreme Court could not have
intended that the careful limits they were placing on investigative detention
could be completely bypassed by the current police practice in Toronto
of approaching young persons, getting their names, doing a CPIC search
and then launching into aggressive questions aimed at incrimination.
Surely, contrary to some recent rulings,74 suspects are detained when
police start to ask a person for identification to facilitate a criminal
records search and/or search backpacks, whether the person is in a vehicle,
on public transit or in the street.
The Supreme Court earlier extended beyond physical detention to
psychological detention, which it defines as where the person confronted
by the police reasonably believes there is no choice but to comply.75 The
72

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1, at para. 19 (S.C.C.).
74
See too R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 43 C.R. (6th) 280 (Alta. C.A) and R. v.
Lewis, [2007] N.S.J. No. 18, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 82 (N.S.C.A.). Compare, however, findings of
detention in R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Suberu, [2007]
O.J. No. 317, 45 C.R. (6th) 47 (Ont. C.A.) (investigative detention triggers s. 10(b) protection). For
further discussion, see footnote 106 and R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220 (Ont. C.A.)
(majority holding no power to compel identification other than for traffic offences leading to s. 8
breach). See also the persuasive analysis of Lane J. in R. v. Powell, [2000] O.J. No. 2229, 35 C.R.
(5th) 89 (Ont. C.J.) (pedestrian stopped for identification and records check arbitrarily detained),
expressly overruled in R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 86 O.R. (3d) 730 (Ont. C.A.), of LaForme J.
(as he then was) in R. v. Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 21 C.R. (6th) 65 (Ont. S.C.J.) and of
Jones J. in R. v. D. (J.), [2007] O.J. No. 1365, 45 C.R. (6th) 292 (Ont. C.J.), discussed further on
page 45.
75
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
73
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Court needs to return to the issue of what constitutes detention to trigger
section 10(b) rights. Contrary to the recent view of the Ontario Court
of Appeal in B. (L.)76 a host of other courts have applied the concept of
psychological detention developed in the context of vehicle stops equally
to stops of pedestrians. The problem with a sole focus on physical or
psychological detention is that this leaves without Charter protection one
naively unaware that the only real choice is to comply. That test also
encourages police to avoid sections 9 and 10 rights by delaying arrest
and resorting to such strategies as being polite and falsely telling the
detainee he or she is free to leave.
This concern would be addressed by an alternative test that detention
also occurs whenever the police suspect the person and attempt to obtain
incriminating evidence. This was the test carefully justified by a majority
of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins77 but it was
rejected by the Supreme Court with the briefest of reasons on the appeal
as of right.78 A focus on the stage of investigation is part of the often
relied upon multi-factor approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Moran.79 The Court could rely on the test of a “functional equivalent of
interrogation” it developed in R. v. Broyles80 as one of the triggers for
the pre-trial right to silence.
3. Vehicle Stops
In Hufsky81 and Ladouceuer82 the Supreme Court held that a stop
under a general provincial highway traffic stop power, which set out no
criteria for the exercise of discretion, was arbitrary and contrary to
section 9. However the majority found that the stop power was a
demonstrably justified reasonable limit under section 1 given the difficulty
of enforcing impaired driving and other traffic laws, especially on rural
roads. Justice Sopinka dissented in the case of roving stops on the basis
that this was the last straw: police would be able to stop “any vehicle at
76

R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 86 O.R. (3d) 730 (Ont. C.A.).
[1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 286 (Nfld. C.A.).
78
R. v. Hawkins, [1993] S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.). But see, however,
R. v. Grant, [1991] S.C.J. No. 78, 7 C.R. (4th) 388 (S.C.C.), where the Court quickly found a
detention on the basis of police suspicion.
79
R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), as recently re-emphasized
by MacDonnell J. in R. v. K. (G.), [2007] O.J. No. 4308 (Ont. C.J.).
80
[1991] S.C.J. No. 95, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.).
81
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.).
82
R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.).
77
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any time, in any place, without having any reason to do so”.83 Courts
have in partial response to Sopinka J. since made it clear that the stop
must be for vehicle-related reasons and that any search must meet
section 8 tests.84
I have come to believe that this pro-state position is the right balance.
There is a qualitative distinction between vehicle and pedestrian stops.
Walking the streets is an important civil liberty. But driving a vehicle,
given the potential for harm, is a licensed privilege. Police must indeed
be afforded a wide stop power to be able to check for impairment and
unlicensed driving.85
In Orbanski, Elias (2005),86 Charron J., for a 7-2 majority87 of the
Supreme Court, held that police following a lawful vehicle stop have
implied and constitutional powers to question motorists about their sobriety
and to ask them to perform sobriety tests. These powers were held to fall
within the scope of reasonable police authority conferred by necessary
implication from operational requirements of combined provincial and
federal statutes. Those operational requirements were also held to impliedly
prescribe limits on section 10(b) right to counsel. The majority held that
these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1, given the dangers
of drunk driving. The majority followed Milne (1996)88 in limiting the
results of these investigative techniques to the threshold determination
of reasonable grounds that the driver is impaired. It was not permissible
for the Crown to introduce the results of compelled direct participation
in roadside tests and police questioning about alcohol consumption to
incriminate at a subsequent trial. The Court adds that Milne makes it
clear that this does not prevent the officer from otherwise testifying as to
his observations as to signs of impairment to prove impairment.89

83

R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1264 (S.C.C.).
See, for example, R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), and R. v. MacLennan, [1995]
N.S.J. No. 77, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 69 (N.S.C.A.).
85
In contrast David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2006), at 143-44 suggests that given the prevalence of racial profiling the Supreme
Court should reverse itself and require that vehicle stops be for probable cause.
86
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.).
87
McLachlin C.J.C., Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Deschamps and Abella JJ. concurred.
88
R. v. Milne, [1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (Ont. C.A.).
89
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205, at para. 58 (S.C.C.).
84
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Justice LeBel90 issued a strong and compelling91 dissent. Although
recognizing that impaired driving is a serious danger, the dissenting
justices were of the view that:
It is not appropriate to adopt a strained legal interpretation to sidestep
inconvenient Charter rights for the greater good. Curtailing Charter
protections through and the inventive use of the law-making powers of
the courts is even less acceptable. Doing so turns the country’s legal
system upside down. Ironically enough, while Charter rights relating
to the criminal justice system were developed by the common law, the
common law would now be used to trump and restrict them. 92

The majority’s argument was seen to be circular. The operational
requirements of a legislative provision could not stand apart from the
statute as a distinct source of powers and obligations. The power to ask
questions or to request sobriety tests was found nowhere in the statutes
and could not be found by implication or by a broad interpretation.
Enabling the courts to limit rights through the development of common
law police powers simply on the basis of the needs of the police preempted a serious review of limits on constitutional rights. Although it
was conceded that drivers are under no obligation to perform the tests or
to answer the questions, the majority had not required that they be
reminded of their constitutional rights. There appeared to be some
concern that they might otherwise choose to exercise the approaches to
sobriety tests.93 The Court, concluded the minority, should be cautious
in creating such powers, especially given that legislation was pending in
Manitoba and federally.
It is indeed hard to see why the majority did not wait for the
comprehensive new legislation with its standardized approach to sobriety
tests. Nevertheless, the powers authorized by the majority seem reasonable
and not excessive given the problem of detecting impaired driving.
Here, too, the Court achieved the right balance.

90
91
92
93

Justice Fish concurred.
See, too, Tim Quigley, “Annotation: R. v. Orbanski” (2005) 29 C.R. (6th) 205.
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205, at para. 70 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205, at para. 82 (S.C.C.).
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4. Investigative Detention: R. v. Mann
In Mann,94 a majority of the Supreme Court applied the Waterfield95
approach to ancillary powers and adopted much of the earlier approach
of Doherty J.A. in his trail-blazing judgment in Simpson.96 The Ontario
Court of Appeal had created a power of investigative detention based on
articulable cause defined as “a constellation of objectively discernible
facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that
the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation”.97
Justice Doherty carefully noted that a police “hunch” based entirely
on intuition gained by experience would not be enough even if it proved
accurate. Such subjectively based assessments “can too easily mask
discriminatory conduct based on such irrelevant factors as the detainee’s
sex, colour, age, ethnic origin or sexual orientation”.98
The Supreme Court majority announced a preference for the phrase
“reasonable grounds to detain” rather than the U.S. phrase of “articulable
cause” adopted by Doherty J.A.99 It also set out to declare “concrete
guidelines” for investigative detention rather than leaving the matter,
as had Simpson,100 to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. After lengthy
analysis, the Court established the following four requirements:
(1) “Police officers may detain an individual for investigative purposes
if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances
that the individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a
detention is necessary”.101
(2) “[W]here a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that his
or her safety or that of others is at risk, the officer may engage in a
protective pat-down search of the detained individual.”
(3) “Both the detention and the pat-down search must be conducted in a
reasonable manner.”
94

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.).
96
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
97
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1, at 22 (Ont. C.A.).
98
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1, at 22 (Ont. C.A.).
99
In dissent, Deschamps J. is persuasive in her view that the majority should not have
departed from the articulable cause language which had proved useful and workable. The change
would risk confusion with the higher standard of reasonable ground required for arrest.
100
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
101
The importance of this limit was recently stressed in R. v. Houben, [2006] S.J. No. 715,
44 C.R. (6th) 338 (Sask. C.A.) and R. v. Linton, [2007] O.J. No. 2265, 48 C.R. (6th) 224 (Ont. C.J.).
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(4) “[T]he investigative detention should be brief in duration and does
not impose an obligation on the detained individual to answer
questions posed by the police”.102
The Court had earlier emphasized that police officers may detain an
individual only if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the
circumstances that there is a “clear nexus between the individual to be
detained and a recent or on-going criminal offence”103 and that the detention
is reasonably necessary on an objective view of the circumstances. This
amounted to a major shift in Canadian law. Police no longer had power
to stop based on a general suspicion of criminal activity. The overall
reasonableness must be further assessed against all of the circumstances,
most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty
is necessary to the performance of the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered
with, and the nature and extent of the interference.104
A detention for investigative purposes was, held Iacobucci J., subject
to Charter scrutiny.105 At a minimum, individuals who are detained for
investigative purposes must under section 10(a) be advised, in clear and
simple language, of the reasons for the detention. Investigative detentions
carried out in accordance with the common law power recognized in
this case would not infringe the detainee’s rights under section 9 of the
Charter. Mandatory compliance with section 10(b) requirements could
not be transformed into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and artificially,
a detention that must be of brief duration. Other aspects of section 10(b)
should be left for another day.106
Most commentators have been critical of the judicial readiness to
authorize any form of investigative detention.107 It is argued that complex
102

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1, at para. 45 (S.C.C.) (numbers here

added).
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R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1, at para. 34 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
105
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1, at paras. 20-22 (S.C.C.).
106
In R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 45 C.R. (6th) 47 (Ont. C.A), Doherty J.A. held for
the Ontario Court of Appeal that a brief interlude between the commencement of an investigative
detention and the advising of the detained person’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) during which the
officer makes a quick assessment of the situation to decide whether anything more than a brief
detention of the individual may be warranted, is not inconsistent with the requirement that a
detained person be advised of his or her right to counsel “without delay”. This appears to achieve a
good compromise. However it is not clear why the Court did not apply its s. 7 remarks based on
R. v. Milne, [1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (Ont. C.A.) and rule that evidence of the
incriminating statements during this investigative detention could not be used to incriminate.
107
For comments on Mann, see Eric Gottardi, “R. v. Mann: Regulating State Intrusions in
the Context of Investigative Detentions” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 27; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a
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police powers matters are a matter for Parliament and inconsistent with
the Hunter v. Southam108 view that the Charter is in place to constrain
rather than authorize State action. The trumping consideration for me,
again, is that Parliament, given its consistent law-and-order mood, would
very likely opt for a more general power of investigative detention far
less supportive of the rights of citizens than the Supreme Court. The
Mann109 regime is a constrained and balanced response that does not
authorize police harassment of vulnerable groups on mere suspicion. Of
course the limits must be rigorously insisted upon by courts if the rule of
law is to be meaningful, and the courts must also, as in Mann itself, be
prepared to exclude in the event of breaches of such important standards.
5. Roadblock Stops: R. v. Clayton
In Clayton (2005),110 Doherty J.A., speaking for the Ontario Court
of Appeal,111 turned again to the ancillary powers doctrine to create
roadblock stop powers distinct from the investigative detention power
recognized in Mann.112 At about 1:25 a.m. on September 24, 1999, an
individual made a 911 call from a coffee shop located across from a
strip club indicating that about 10 black men were congregated outside
the club and that four had handguns. He described by model and colour
four vehicles that he associated with the group of individuals in the
parking area. A number of police vehicles converged on the scene. Two
officers, Robson and Dickson, arrived at the rear exit to the parking lot
at 1:26 a.m. and parked near that exit. They intended to stop any vehicle
Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; David Tanovich, “The Colourless World of Mann”
(2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58;
Lesley McCoy, “Some Answers from the Supreme Court on Investigative Detention . . . And Some
More Questions” (2004) 49 Crim. L.Q. 268; James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created
Police Powers: Investigative Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299; Alec Fiszauf,
“Articulating Cause ― Investigative Detention and its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327 and
Christina Skibinsky, “Regulating Mann in Canada” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 197. See earlier
Stephen Coughlan, “Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with Caution or Full Stop?”
(2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten
Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev 335; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique
of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L Rev. 935; Patrick Healey, “Investigative Detention in Canada”
(2005) Crim. L.R. 98; and James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1.
108
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Clayton, [2005] O.J. No. 1078, 27 C.R. (5th) 197 (Ont. C.A.).
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McMurtry C.J.O. and Lang J.A. concurred.
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R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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attempting to exit the parking lot and to investigate the “gun call”. The
first car they stopped was a sporty black Jaguar driven by a black man,
Farmer, with another black man, Clayton, in the passenger seat. The
Jaguar did not match, or even come close to, the description of any of
the four vehicles provided by the 911 caller. One officer advised Clayton
that he was investigating a gun call and told him to step out of the vehicle.
As soon as the officer touched Clayton, a struggle ensued and Clayton
ran towards the front of the strip club. Robson and Dickson gave chase.
On his arrest he acknowledged he had a gun in his pocket. It was
removed and he was arrested. Farmer was also arrested and found to be
in possession of a gun. Both accused were charged with a number of
firearms offences.
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, quashed the
convictions and substituted acquittals. The Court held that the initial
roadblock stop was unlawful. Justice Doherty held that as the police did
not have reasonable grounds to suspect that either accused was implicated
in criminal activity, the detention could not be justified as investigative
detention under Mann.113 There was no reasonable individualized suspicion.
There were also no specific statutory powers to establish roadblocks.
Justice Doherty then held that the ancillary police power can justify the
use of a roadblock stop to investigate and prevent crime as well as
apprehend offenders. Where the police do not have grounds to suspect
any specific person or persons, however, the use of a roadblock stop
could not, he held, be justified in furtherance of the police duty to
investigate and prevent crime unless the police have reasonable grounds
to believe both that a serious crime has been committed and that the
roadblock stop may apprehend the perpetrator. Justice Doherty added
that the existence of those reasonable grounds would not necessarily
justify the use of a roadblock stop. If those prerequisites exist, then other
factors, like the availability of other less intrusive investigative alternatives,
have to be taken into account. The Court of Appeal concluded that the
“roadblock” was unlawful because there was no imminent danger and
because the police did not tailor their intervention to stop only the four
vehicles identified in the 911 call. Had they properly tailored their response,
Farmer and Clayton’s vehicle would not have been detained. As a result,
their detention and subsequent searches violated sections 9 and 8 of the
Charter. The evidence was furthermore excluded under section 24(2).

113

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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In the Supreme Court114 all nine justices decided that on these facts
there had been no section 8 or section 9 breaches and therefore no need
for any remedy. Like Doherty J.A., the Court saw the need for a roadblock
stop powers wider than Mann.115 Justice Abella sets out loose parameters
as follows:
The justification for a police officer’s decision to detain, as developed
in Dedman and most recently interpreted in Mann, will depend on the
“totality of the circumstances” underlying the officer’s suspicion that
the detention of a particular individual is “reasonably necessary”. If,
for example, the police have particulars about the individuals said to be
endangering the public, their right to further detain will flow accordingly.
As explained earlier in Mann, searches will only be permitted where
the officer believes on reasonable grounds that his or her safety, or that of
others, is at risk.
The determination will focus on the nature of the situation, including
the seriousness of the offence, as well as on the information known to
the police about the suspect or the crime, and the extent to which the
detention was reasonably responsive or tailored to these circumstances,
including its geographic and temporal scope. This means balancing the
seriousness of the risk to public or individual safety with the liberty
interests of members of the public to determine whether, given the
extent of the risk, the nature of the stop is no more intrusive of liberty
interests than is reasonably necessary to address the risk. 116

In the view of the Abella cohort, both the initial and the continuing
detentions of Clayton and Farmer’s car were justified based on the
information the police had, the nature of the offence, and the timing and
location of the detention. The initial detention in this case was reasonably
necessary to respond to the seriousness of the offence and the threat to
police and public safety inherent in the presence of prohibited weapons
in a public place, and was temporally, geographically and logistically
responsive to the circumstances known by the police when it was set up.
The initial stop was consequently a justifiable use of police powers
associated with the police duty to investigate the offences described by
the 911 caller and did not represent an arbitrary detention contrary to
section 9 of the Charter. The officers’ safety concerns justified the
searches incidental to detention.
114
115
116

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at paras. 30-31 (S.C.C.).
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The Supreme Court in Clayton117 is persuasive in deciding that the
Ontario Court of Appeal got it wrong on the facts. However it is
disappointing that Abella J. would return to a case-by-case approach,
which the Court expressly sought to avoid when it set out limiting
criteria for investigative detention in Mann.118 The Mann regime is still
intact in the case of stops based on individualized suspicion.
The Abella cohort of six justices has adopted an independent
emergency stop power wider than necessary. In the interests of clarity
and certainty it would have been preferable had the Court more clearly
accepted Doherty J.A.’s twin criteria of reasonable grounds to suspect a
serious crime and reasonable grounds for believing that a roadblock stop
would find the culprit.
As Stephen Coughlan puts it,119 a test of what is reasonably necessary
in the circumstances provides little more guidance for the police than to
guess whether they have power to blockade in other circumstances.
The Binnie cohort of three justices would have preferred to build
this emergency stop power around the issue of reasonable grounds to
believe that a firearms offence has been committed, encouraging Parliament
to address any need for wider emergency powers. In their view, the
following new common law police power should be recognized:
(1) to form a blockade (2) on receipt of information the police consider
reliable (3) about serious firearms offences underway or recently
committed (4) limited to the premises where the offence allegedly
occurred (5) sufficiently soon after the alleged incident to give police
reasonable grounds for belief that the perpetrators may be caught. 120

There is a profound and mind-boggling disagreement between Abella
and Binnie JJ. as to the proper approach to justification under section 9.
Justice Abella starts with the following proposition:
If the police conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was
no violation of their Charter rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct
fell outside the scope of these powers, it represented an infringement

117

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
119
Stephen Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law: Annotation to
R. v. Clayton” (2007) 47 C.R. (6th) 266.
120
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 89 (S.C.C.).
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of the right under the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or subjected
to an unreasonable search or seizure.121

It has long been accepted that, unlike the test for section 8, a finding
of unlawfulness does not necessarily mean the detention was arbitrary.
That proposition now seems to have been reversed. On the other hand,
Abella J. hastens to state that just because a detention is lawful, it is not
exempt from Charter scrutiny. Yet, in the next breath, she announces
that the ancillary powers doctrine is
consistent with Charter values because it requires the state to justify
the interference with liberty based on criteria which focus on whether the
interference with liberty is necessary given the extent of the risk and
the liberty at stake, and no more intrusive to liberty than reasonably
necessary to address the risk. The standard of justification must be
commensurate with the fundamental rights at stake.122

The Binnie cohort called for a more meaningful standard of Charter
scrutiny under which justification must be determined under section 1.
“Reasonably necessary” was no substitute for Charter review. The more
specific power they would have adopted could be justified under the
Oakes123 test for section 1 as it was carefully tailored and minimally
intrusive.
In the end result both cohorts agree that a blockade power was, in
the circumstances and given the threat of guns, legal, justified and
constitutional. It is indeed unfortunate that the majority were not more
concise in setting out the parameters to this new emergency stop power.
This may lead to roadblock stops being upheld in less compelling
circumstances.
6. Racial Profiling
One of the central policy issues facing the criminal justice system is
how courts should respond to issues of racial profiling. The issue has
not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, which has indeed
been criticized for ducking the issue in Mann.124 The Supreme Court of
121

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 19 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
123
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
124
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). See, for example, David
Tanovich, “The Colourless World of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Benjamin Berger, “Race and
Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58; James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially
122
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Canada has taken judicial notice of racism in Williams125 respecting jury
screening, and in Golden126 it indicated that strip search standards
had to be set taking into account evidence that police powers are
disproportionately used against African-Canadians and Aboriginal people.
However, issues of race have otherwise been avoided.
The approach of Doherty J.A. in Simpson127 was in part aimed to
protect against enforcement based on race. Several commentators suggested
that the Court did not go far enough. Morden J.A. for the Ontario Court
of Appeal in Brown (2003)128 did indeed later go much further. The
Court adopted the following definitions: “Racial profiling involves the
targeting of individual members of a particular racial group, on the basis
of the supposed criminal propensity of the entire group.”129
The Court also quoted a longer definition offered by the African
Canadian Legal Clinic in an earlier case of Richards (1999),130 as set
forth in the reasons of Rosenberg J.A:
Racial profiling is criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour
profiling refers to that phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity
is attributed to an identified group in society on the basis of race or
colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group.
In this context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality
or general criminal propensity of an entire racial group.131

According to the Court in Brown,132 the attitude underlying racial
profiling is one that may be consciously or unconsciously held. The police
officer need not be an overt racist. His or her conduct may be based on
Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299; Alec Fiszauf,
“Articulating Cause — Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327.
Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41, at 44 points out that
Mann’s clothing did not in fact match the description of clothing worn by the suspect. The police
were looking for a “young male Aboriginal, approximately five feet eight inches tall, weighing 165
pounds” wearing a black jacket with white sleeves. Mann was wearing a pullover sweater with a
kangaroo pouch pocket. Quigley suggests a serious concern that being Aboriginal and fitting a
rather general description while in an inner-city area was held to amount to reasonable suspicion to
provide grounds for the detention.
125
R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.).
126
R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 47 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.).
127
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
128
R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.). Laskin and Feldman JJ.A.
concurred.
129
R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240, at 246 (Ont. C.A.).
130
R. v. Richards, [1999] O.J. No. 1420, 26 C.R. (5th) 286 (Ont. C.A.).
131
R. v. Richards, [1999] O.J. No. 1420, 26 C.R. (5th) 286, at 295 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.).
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subconscious racial stereotyping. The Court held that the Crown counsel
on appeal had been responsible for conceding the existence of the
phenomenon of racial profiling. It further noted that the conclusion was
supported by significant social science research and quoted from the
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal
Justice System:
The Commission’s findings suggest that racialized characteristics,
especially those of black people, in combination with other factors,
provoke police suspicion, at least in Metro Toronto. Other factors that
may attract police attention include sex (male), youth, make and condition
of car (if any), location, dress and perceived lifestyle. Black persons
perceived to have many of these attributes are at high risk of being
stopped on foot or in cars. This explanation is consistent with our findings
that, overall, black people are more likely than others to experience the
unwelcome intrusion of being stopped by the police. 133

The Court saw no dispute respecting the test to be applied under
section 9 of the Charter. The question in Brown134 was whether the police
officer who stopped a motorist for speeding on the Don Valley Parkway
in Toronto had articulable cause for the stop. If a police officer stops a
person based on his or her colour (or on any other discriminatory ground),
the purpose was improper and clearly would not be an articulable cause:
Accordingly, to succeed on the application before the trial judge, the
respondent had to prove that it was more probable than not that there
was no articulable cause for the stop, specifically, on the evidence in
this case, that the real reason for the stop was the fact that he was black.135

To the court it was self-evident that a stop based solely on race
constituted arbitrary detention contrary to section 9 and presumably
violated section 8 on the basis of lack of reasonable grounds.
The comments in Brown136 were largely obiter as the Court was
ordering a new trial because of a reasonable apprehension of bias by the
trial judge. The trial judge had indicated a concern about the seriousness
of the accusations, admonished the defence counsel for the tone of his
voice in cross-examination of the officer and referred to the amount of
time being taken to present the application. After the evidence, the trial
133

(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) (Co-chairs: M. Gittens and D. Cole), at 358,
quoted in R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240, at 246 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.).
135
R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240, at para. 11 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.).
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judge indicated he did not need to hear submissions from the Crown and
dismissed the application. During the sentence hearing, the trial judge
indicated his distaste for the matters raised during the trial and suggested
that the accused should extend an apology to the officer.137
The Court of Appeal could have stopped there but went further.
It held there was evidence before the trial judge capable of supporting a
finding of racial profiling. Justice Morden observed that a racial profiling
claim could rarely be proven by direct evidence. This would involve an
admission by a police officer that he or she was influenced by racial
stereotypes in the exercise of his or her discretion to stop a motorist.
Accordingly, if racial profiling was to be proven it had to be done by
inference drawn from circumstantial evidence. Where the evidence
showed that the circumstances relating to a detention corresponded to
the phenomenon of racial profiling and provided a basis for the Court to
infer that the police officer was lying about why he or she singled out the
accused person for attention, the record was then capable of supporting
a finding that the stop was based on racial profiling. According to
Morden J.A., this did not set the hurdle either too low (which could be
unfair to honest police officers performing their duties in a professional
and unbiased manner) or too high (which would make it virtually
impossible for victims of racial profiling to receive the protection of
their rights under section 9 of the Charter).
At face value, Brown138 would appear to make it much easier than in
the past for an accused person of colour to obtain a Charter remedy against
racial profiling. A ground of distinction and narrowing in subsequent
cases may be the ruling in Brown that the officer altered his initial notes,
which cast a shadow on his credibility.
The definition of racial profiling relied on in Brown139 is extremely
wide, especially in its notion of unconscious racism. How exactly can
that be established, not as a matter of statistical trend but in the case of
the individual officer before the court? Section 8 and section 9 Charter
arguments based on racial profiling are almost always rejected.140 A notable
137

See similarly R. v. Watson, [2004] O.J. No. 4921, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 144 (Ont. C.A.).
Interjections by a trial judge had prevented defence counsel from establishing a claim of racial
profiling. A new trial was ordered.
138
R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 9 C.R. (6th) 240 (Ont. C.A.).
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See, for example, R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 24 C.R. (6th) 15 (B.C.C.A.),
criticized by Tim Quigley, “Annotation: R. v. Greaves” (2005) 24 C.R. (6th) 15, at 17. The Court
allowed the police to rely in part on their belief it was unusual to see a black man in the company of
a white man in that area. See too R. v. Smith, [2004] O.J. No. 4979, 26 C.R. (6th) 375 (Ont. S.C.J.)

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

INVESTIGATIVE POWERS

31

exception to this trend occurred in a cocaine case of Khan (2004),141
where Molloy J. of the Ontario Superior Court disbelieved the police
testimony and found that the accused had been singled out because he
was a young black man driving a Mercedes.
Courts tend to reject racial profiling arguments where race was only
part of the reason for police intervention. David Tanovich, a prolific
advocate for taking racial profiling more seriously,142 has urged courts to
resort to section 15 guarantees and to declare a reverse onus in visible
minority cases where it would be up to the State to demonstrate that the
stop was not based on race. Police assessment of suspicion depends on
experience and interpretation. The problem, suggests Tanovich, is that
this can be influenced or distorted by unconscious racism:
For example, an officer may see a Black man in a White neighbourhood
carrying a Plasma television and decide to stop him to investigate
because, in the officer’s mind, he appears “out of place”. Alternatively,
an officer may interpret a handshake between two Black men in a high
crime area as a drug transaction. Such innocent behaviour might not be
interpreted in such an incriminating manner if the men were White.
Evasive action is another example. An African Canadian who has
historically been harassed by the police or who is aware of a history of
community harassment may understandably avoid a police officer who
is approaching, not out of a case of consciousness of guilt, but to avoid
being harassed, or in some cases, out of a sense of self-preservation.143

Some lower court judges have favoured a reverse onus for racial
profiling.144 However, Doherty J.A., for the Ontario Court of Appeal

(border crossing) and the full review of rulings by David Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling”
(2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 905.
141
R. v. Khan, [2004] O.J. No. 3819, 24 C.R. (6th) 48 (Ont. S.C.J.). See, too, R. v. Calderon,
[2004] O.J. No. 3474, 23 C.R. (6th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) (majority holding vehicle stop arbitrary in part
because it was based on a stereotypical observation that car was too expensive for its occupants)
and R. v. Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 21 C.R. (6th) 65 (Ont. S.C.J.) (walking away from police
in high crime area not amounting to reasonable grounds to detain). In Ferdinand, the court shied
away from categorizing the conduct as racial profiling.
142
See, for example, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an
Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145; “E-Racing
Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 905; and “R. v. Griffiths: Race and Arbitrary Detention”
(2003) 11 C.R. (6th) 149.
143
David Tanovich, “The Colourless World of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47, at 53.
144
In R. v. Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 21 C.R. (6th) 65 (Ont. S.C.J.), Laforme J.
(as he then was) held that the accused had the burden of demonstrating detention and then the
burden shifted to the Crown to demonstrate the detention was not arbitrary. In R. v. McKennon,
[2004] O.J. No. 5021 (Ont. S.C.J.), Hill J. remarked enigmatically “I tend to the view that in a
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in Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board,145 concerning an
unsuccessful civil suit alleging racial profiling, refused to reverse the
ultimate burden. The reality of racial profiling could not be denied but
the Court could not accept that “racial profiling is the rule rather than
the exception where the police detain black men”.146 Justice Doherty did
hold that there would be a “significant tactical burden” on the defendant.147
Some point to the dangers of relying on anecdotal evidence of racial
profiling or on less than rigorous statistical data. For example, Alan
Gold has written that:
There is more than a real possibility of a vicious cycle or self-fulfilling
prophecy regarding racial profiling which begins with claims, is
fuelled by publicity, and leads to stronger beliefs and more claims.148

Few would suggest that racial profiling is not a serious social wrong
to be taken seriously by courts. However Professor Ed Morgan149 sees
the articulable cause approach adopted in Simpson150 as too restrictive.
According to Morgan, depending on the context, sex, age, ethnic origin
and sexual orientation are relevant grounds of investigation. He suggests
that the Simpson principles should not be applied in other contexts such
as immigration and border crossings, given the “ubiquitous threat of mass
violence” since the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.
This view is surprisingly insensitive to the experience of Muslim and
Arab Canadians who have presented significant anecdotal and survey
traffic stop case the discharge of proof regarding compliance with the Constitution and with the
individual s. 9 Charter right should generally be on the government” (at para. 33).
145
[2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43 C.R. (6th) 175 (Ont. C.A.).
146
Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43 C.R. (6th) 175,
at 209 (Ont. C.A.).
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Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43 C.R. (6th) 175,
at para. 151 (Ont. C.A.).
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had been hired by then Toronto Chief of Police Julian Fantino to refute a series of articles published
in the Toronto Star asserting widespread racial profiling by the Toronto Police Service. See, too,
critical reviews published in the same journal by Ron Melchers, “Do Toronto Police Engage in
Racial Profiling?” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. 347 and Scot Wortley & Julian Tanner, “Data, Denials,
and Confusion: The Racial Profiling Debate in Toronto” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. 367. The most
rigorous studies showing racial profiling are Scot Wortley & Julian Tanner, “Inflammatory
Rhetoric? Baseless Accusations? A Response to Gabor’s Critique of Racial Profiling Research
in Canada” (2005) 47 Can. J. Crim. 581 and Professor Wortley’s year -long study of
racialized statistics kept by the Kingston Police Force, online: <http://www.police.kingston.on.ca/
Data%20Collection%20Final%20Report%202005-09-15.pdf>. See reviews by David Tanovich,
The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 76-82.
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“Racial Profiling as an Investigative Tool” Law Times (October 15, 2002).
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evidence to Parliamentary committees that they have been racially
targeted.151 Principles being developed in the context of criminal trials
seem equally applicable.152
Professor Tanovich’s recent major study of race issues in the Canadian
justice system153 certainly provides a strong basis for suggesting defence
counsel and our courts are too reticent to address such concerns. There
is a disturbing pattern of trial counsel and judges ignoring the admittedly
difficult and sensitive issue of race despite considerable evidence of
systemic discrimination in stops. It may be that counsel have found by
experience that directly playing the race card is an unwise strategy, in
practice hard to establish and also time-consuming and expensive. The
problem is that if race is not raised at trial, courts of appeal will not be
able to take judicial notice of this adjudicative fact on appeal.154 Some
say that Mann155 and Clayton156 are so broad that they can be the vehicles
for racial profiling. Properly applied, I suggest they are not open to such
abuse, especially if courts are prepared to resort to the remedy of
exclusion for violations. Narrow interpretations of detention for section
9 and section 10 purposes could be avoided by relying on the section 15
guarantee against racial discrimination in the enforcement of laws.157
That right has no triggering requirement.
In contrast to these judicial efforts, no federal or provincial Parliament
has done anything legislatively about racial profiling. Governments are
wary of requiring the keeping of racialized statistics in view of police
opposition,158 so transparency is not the norm.
151
Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN), Presumption of Guilt:
A National Survey on Security Visitations of Canadian Muslims (2005), online: <http://www.caircan.ca/
downloads/POG-08062005.pdf>. Eight per cent of respondents reported visits by security officials at
home or place of work.
152
See, too, Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion,
Constitutional Remedies and Democratic Accountability” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Reem
Bahdi, “No Exit : Racial Profiling and Canada’s War Against Terrorism” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 293 and David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2006), at 105-17.
153
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2006).
154
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155
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
157
See obiter pronouncements of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. Smith, [1993]
N.S.J. No. 289, 23 C.R. (4th) 164 (N.S.C.A.) (race) and R. v. White, [1994] N.S.J. No. 516, 35 C.R.
(4th) 88 (N.S.C.A.) (gender).
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See David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law,
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IV. POWER TO INTERROGATE
1. Section 7, Section 10(b) and Common Law Standards
Section 10(b) requires that a person arrested or detained must be
informed of the right to counsel and of legal aid and any duty counsel
programs159 and, if the person asserts his or her right with reasonable
diligence, the police must implement this by,
•

affording privacy

•

not eliciting evidence until counsel has been consulted

•

allowing reasonable opportunity for counsel to be consulted

•

permitting counsel to be present for plea bargaining, and not
denigrating defence counsel.160

Section 7 affords a pre-trial right to silence against interrogation by
undercover agents, which
•

does not require that the accused be advised of that right

•

applies on detention

•

prohibits active elicitation “functionally equivalent to interrogation”161

•

does not apply to non state agents, and

•

allows for questioning after counsel has been consulted.

The principle of self-incrimination once described by the Supreme
Court as the organizing principle of criminal law capable of growth162
has now been reduced to a principle of “limited application”.163

159
R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.).
160
R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.), R. v. Bartle,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).
161
R. v. Broyles, [1991] S.C.J. No. 95, 2 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.).
162
R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.).
163
R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678 (S.C.C.). In R. v. Jones, [2006]
O.J. No. 3315, 41 C.R. (6th) 84 (Ont. C.A.), the principle was held to have no application to routine
border crossing screening.
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In the context of police interrogation by known officers, the section
7 right to silence is not breached where police interrogators ignore
repeated assertions of the right to silence.164
The revised common law voluntary confession rule165 requires that a
statement to a person in authority is inadmissible if it is the product of
a threat or inducement, not of an operating mind, where oppressive
conditions have resulted in involuntariness and if the police conduct
would shock the conscience of the community.
The common law normally allows no adverse inference to be drawn
from pre-trial silence, otherwise it would be a “snare and delusion” for
police to advise of the right to silence.166
2. Gaps in Protection
Under this complex picture, the main control on police interrogation
in custody lies not in the Charter but in the common law confession rule
as revised in Oickle.167 I have elsewhere argued that the majority in
Oickle allowed police too much scope for coercive interrogations.168
The recent majority ruling in Spencer169 makes it very clear that the
police are to be given considerable leeway to offer inducements to obtain
confessions without rendering a statement involuntary. Charged with
robbery, the accused was very much concerned with whether his girlfriend
would also be charged. The majority see the case as all about promises.
Like the dissenters, I see the transcript as all about an implied threat to
charge the girlfriend unless Spencer confessed. Yes, the police did not
claim to have authority to offer leniency for his girlfriend but they certainly
indicated they would speak to the Crown if he confessed. Spencer and
Oickle170 will encourage police to exploit emotions about possible
164

In its recent controversial and stunning ruling in R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007
SCC 48 (S.C.C.), a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court did not follow the trend in lower courts: see
R. v. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 37 C.R. (5th) 320 (Que. C.A.), R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252,
15 C.R. (6th) 282 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. K. (C.), [2005] O.J. No. 4853, 36 C.R. (6th) 153 (Ont. C.J.) and
R. v. Reader, [2007] M.J. No. 225, 49 C.R. (6th) 301 (Man. Q.B.).
165
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
166
R. v. Chambers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 108, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293 (S.C.C.); R. v. Turcotte,
[2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.).
167
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
168
See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON:
Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 134-42.
169
R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, 44 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.).
170
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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prosecution against partners. Oickle says police may use polygraphs and
lie about their accuracy. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Osmar171 found
nothing in the Charter or Oickle to prevent police to pretend to be
members of organized crime (the “Mr. Big” strategy) in their undercover
investigations to obtain confessions. Oickle has resulted in disturbingly
few judicial controls on interrogation.
There are some trial judges who have relied on Oickle172 to exclude
confessions on the basis that oppression has produced involuntariness,
but they have often felt it necessary to buttress their rulings by also finding
a section 7 breach.173 The resort to section 7 is no longer available given
the surprising and disappointing ruling by the 5-4 majority in Singh174
that the section 7 pre-trial right to silence is subsumed by the voluntary
confession rule.
In raising issues of right to counsel, right to silence and common
law protections, I may be straying from my wide topic of investigative
police powers under the Charter. I will rest content with identifying four
gaps in the current complex regime:
(1) Implementation duties in the case of the section 10(b) right to counsel
exist only where a detainee knows enough to assert them.
(2) The presence of a lawyer is required for plea bargain discussions175
but not for interrogation.
(3) There is still no section 7 Charter requirement that the accused be
advised of the right to silence during custodial interrogation.

171

R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 44 C.R. (6th) 276 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
173
See recently R. v. Hammerstrom, [2006] B.C.J. No. 3188, 43 C.R. (6th) 346 (B.C.S.C.)
(police tricked accused that the crime had been videotaped on a store surveillance tape) and, earlier,
R. v. Oliver, [2001] O.J. No. 5984, 44 C.R. (5th) 89 (Ont. S.C.J.) (conduct of interrogator and
silence in face of objective evidence of vulnerability and confusion) and R. v. N., [2005] O.J. No. 357,
28 C.R. (6th) 140 (Ont. S.C.J.) (five-hour polygraph, hostile interrogation and shocking number of
tricks). Before R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), see, too, R. v. S.
(M.J.), [2000] A.J. No. 391, 32 C.R. (5th) 378 (Alta. P.C.) (where Ketchum Prov. Ct. J. excluded a
confession in part because the videotape revealed the oppressive atmosphere and psychological
brainwashing technique developed using the Reid method pioneered in the United States).
174
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
175
R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).
172
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(4) There is no free-standing discretion, as there is in the United
Kingdom, 176 to exclude where police interrogation methods are
considered oppressive and not just where they shock the community.
Regulation of police interrogation is one area where Parliament may
have achieved a better balance than the courts. Under section 269.1 of
the Criminal Code,177 torture is an indictable offence punishable to a
maximum of 14 years. Torture is widely defined in section 269.1(2) as
“any act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person”.
Further under subsection 269.1(4), a statement obtained by torture is
inadmissible in any proceedings over which Parliament has jurisdiction.
This may be the vehicle to argue for further checks on police interrogation.

V. REMEDY OF EXCLUSION FOR CHARTER BREACHES
1. Current Test
Conscripted evidence obtained in violation of the Charter, and
evidence derived from that evidence, will generally affect the fairness of
the trial and should be excluded. This does not require the consideration
of the second and third Collins factors of seriousness of the violation
and affect on the repute of the system unless the Crown establishes that
they would have discovered the evidence without the Charter violation.178
Non-conscripted evidence requires a consideration of the second
and third Collins factors of seriousness of the violation and the effect on
the repute of the system. There is no automatic inclusion because the
evidence is essential to the Crown’s case.179
Justice LeBel in his dissenting opinion in Orbanski (2005)180 signalled
that the Supreme Court will soon revise its approach to section 24(2). In
particular, it is likely that the Court will make it beyond dispute that all
176
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60, s. 76(2). Under s. 76(8)
oppression “includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or the use or threat of violence
(whether or not amounting to torture)”.
177
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
178
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Stillman,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
179
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
180
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.). Fish J.
concurred. The majority did not find it necessary to address s. 24(2).
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the Collins181 factors must be considered even where the evidence is
conscripted. Justice LeBel says the following:
Undoubtedly, the present case is not a proper one for a full-fledged
review of the problems surrounding the interpretation and the method
of application of s. 24(2), especially in the context of what is a partial
dissent. Nevertheless, some general comments appear to be in order,
because concerns about a quasi-automatic exclusion of evidence may
have an impact on the definition of constitutional rights in the criminal
process by Canadian courts.
It is likely that few Charter provisions have generated so much
academic comment, conflicting jurisprudential developments, media
rhetoric or just plain uneasiness as s. 24(2). Since the Charter came
into force, our Court has returned on many occasions to the interpretation
and application of this provision. It has developed and refined methods
of analysis and application. Despite all these efforts, doubts and
misunderstandings remain. They arise mostly from views which
attempt to read into the jurisprudence of our Court the creation of an
exclusionary rule in the case of conscriptive evidence.
.....
The creation and application of a rule, based on a presumption
that conscriptive evidence necessarily affects the fairness of a trial, of
almost automatic exclusion whenever such evidence is involved might
be viewed as a clear and effective method to manage aspects of the
criminal trial. Nevertheless, our Court has never adopted such a rule,
which could not be reconciled with the structure and the wording of
s. 24(2).182

There is a growing trend in lower court decisions to rely on the
minority opinion in Orbanski183 to require that all three Collins184 factors
be examined in every section 24(2) ruling. There is now very strong
pressure on the full Supreme Court to conduct a review of its section 24(2)
jurisprudence on conscripted evidence and to allow for more discretion.
For one who sees the judicial declaration and enforcement of Charter
rights for accused since 1982 as having provided one of the very few
real checks to the ever-increasing law-and-order frenzy of politicians of
181
182

R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205, at paras. 86-87, 98

(S.C.C.).
183
184

R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
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all stripes, talk of a Supreme Court review of the section 24(2) tests is
cause for concern and reflection.
2. Problems: Conscription and Discoverability
A review is indeed necessary. The distinction between conscripted
and non-conscripted evidence, drawn by the Supreme Court in Collins185
by Lamer C.J.C. as a “matter of personal preference”186 and re-affirmed by
Cory J. in Stillman,187 is not easy to defend nor is it satisfactory. It is not
clear why only a conscripted breach affects trial fairness and is necessarily
more serious than, for example, a drug squad ransacking a private dwelling
without bothering to get a warrant in deliberate violation of section 8.
Justice LeBel’s remarks in Orbanski188 are revisionist. For many years the
effect of Stillman was the drawing of a bright line: conscripted evidence
was almost always excluded and non-conscripted evidence almost always
included. That reality may have made the task easier for busy trial judges
but it was clearly far from what Parliament intended in 1982, given the
legislative history and the discretionary wording of section 24(2).
A satisfactory definition of conscription has also proved elusive.
In Stillman,189 Cory J. did at one point speak in broad terms of one
“compelled to participate in the creation or discovery of the evidence”.190
Yet, in another breath, he speaks of a category approach of compelled
incrimination “by means of a statement, the use of the body or the
production of bodily samples”.191 Courts often now quickly rely on this
narrower category approach for definition. Especially when it comes to
statements, the results are often puzzling. In the case of statements by
accused to police obtained in violation of section 10(b) rights, if there is
no issue of voluntariness in what sense can he or she be said to have
been compelled? Why does forcing someone to reveal where drugs are
stashed result in an unfair trial, whereas police finding the drugs on their
own in breach of Charter standards does not? The emphasis on conscription

185
186
187
188
189
190
191

R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at para. 36 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at para. 75 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at para. 80 (S.C.C.).
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now seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s view in B. (S.A.)192 that
the principle against self-incrimination is a principle of “limited scope”.193
When Binnie J. rethought the section 13 privilege against self-incrimination
tests in Henry,194 he limited the use of immunity protection to situations
where the accused had been earlier actually compelled to testify.
The so-called doctrine of discoverability set out in Stillman195 allows
the second and third Collins factors196 only to be considered in conscripted
cases where the police would have found the evidence without violating
the Charter. This seems to add an obtuse inquiry and is nonsensical.197
Why ask this question at all? It is hard to think of any other question of
remedy that turns not on the evidence before the court but rather on what
might have been the reality. The fact that the police could have found
the evidence without violating the Charter surely makes the violation more
serious and therefore more likely to result in exclusion. The doctrine
would be superfluous if the distinction between conscripted and nonconscripted evidence were to be abandoned.
3. Importance of R. v. Buhay
Hopefully when the Supreme Court comes to review it will be mindful
of, and consistent with, its unanimous decision in Buhay (2003).198 The
Supreme Court there made it crystal clear that there are to be no such
automatic rules of exclusion or inclusion. Justice Arbour writes for all
192
R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678 (S.C.C.). In R. v. Singh, [2007]
S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) Charron J. for the 5-4 majority speaks of the fundamental
principle against self-incrimination, then decimates it in her ruling that the s. 7 right to silence is
subsumed under the voluntary confession rule.
193
R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678, at para. 57 (S.C.C.).
194
R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 33 C.R. (6th) 215 (S.C.C.).
195
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
196
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
197
See further Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough,
ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 568-70. In R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220
(Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. comes very close to finding that Harris was the victim of racial profiling
in finding that for certain groups proactive policing would be more than minimally intrusive and
would indeed be provocative. He also holds that the seriousness of the violation can, in certain
cases, trump the factor of seriousness of the offence. His decision to admit the evidence on the basis
that the police could have got the evidence lawfully had they relied on their observation of the
seatbelt violation is not persuasive. As with any such reliance on the obtuse discoverability doctrine,
surely that consideration made the violation more serious and surely any remedy should be based
on what actually happened?
198
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.). The Buhay principles
were re-asserted in R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.), to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of newly declared criteria for investigative detention.
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nine justices199 and provides a tightly reasoned restatement of the current
position of the Court respecting exclusion of non-conscripted evidence.
The Supreme Court decided that considerable deference should be
given by courts of appeal to determinations by trial judges as to the
second and third Collins200 factors of seriousness of the violation and
effect on the administration of justice. In the course of consideration of
the third factor, Arbour J. writes for the Court, in a passage now frequently
relied on, as follows:
Section 24(2) is not an automatic exclusionary rule . . . neither should
it become an automatic inclusionary rule when the evidence is nonconscriptive and essential to the Crown’s case.201

The combined effect of these pronouncements ― deference to trial
judges and no automatic inclusion ― should and has resulted in greater
exclusion of non-conscripted evidence.
A survey of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal section 8 cases
earlier showed202 a great reluctance to exclude non-conscripted evidence,
especially in drug cases. A much more comprehensive recent survey of
148 section 8 and section 9 rulings, including those of trial judgments,203
points to a different trend to exclusion in half the cases, even when
serious drugs such as crack cocaine were involved. Given that Buhay204
requires deference and that trial judges appear more likely to exclude
than appeal courts, Buhay should and has led to more exclusion.
Of course, deference is an unruly tool of all courts of appeal. They
tend to defer to the trial judge’s findings only when so minded to do so!
Deference also cuts both ways. Courts of appeal would now also be
expected to defer to trial judge rulings not to exclude under section
24(2). However under Buhay205 it should be reversible error to fail to
exclude merely because the evidence is essential to the Crown’s case.
More exclusion is a matter of celebration for those of us who believe
that a real risk of exclusion of evidence is the most effective way to give
meaning to pre-trial Charter rights of accused.
199

Chief Justice McLachlin and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. concurred.
200
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
201
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 71 (S.C.C.).
202
See Don Stuart, “Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero” (1998) 13 C.R. (5th) 50.
203
See Nathan Gorham, “Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero-Point-Five” (2003)
6 C.R. (6th) 257.
204
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
205
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
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Another important aspect of the section 24(2) ruling is that the
Court returns to a pronouncement of Sopinka J. in Kokesch (1994)206
that the factor of police good faith requires that the belief be reasonably
held. In many respects the Buhay207 judgment is a “Sopinka-fest”, with
the Court placing considerable reliance on Sopinka J.’s views expressed
when he was on the Court or as co-author of a leading evidence book.
Here, Arbour J. was concerned that one officer had demonstrated a
“casual attitude”208 to the accused’s Charter rights and the other “blatant
disregard”.209 This was held not to amount to good faith.
Stephen Coughlan has long maintained that such conduct should not
mitigate the seriousness of the violation in such cases, writing that
“[M]embers of the public are entitled to expect that police will not be
careless about respecting rights”.210
Justice Doherty of the Ontario Court of Appeal has held that it is not
helpful to label conduct as good or bad faith as: “Police conduct can run
the gamut from blameless conduct, through negligent conduct to conduct
demonstrating a blatant disregard for Charter rights”211 and “Police
misconduct resulting in a Charter violation can be placed on a continuum ...
between the two extremes of a good faith error and a blatant disregard
for constitutional rights.”212
Recently the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Washington213
wrestled for a year over the question of whether the police had acted in
good faith when they conducted a warrantless search of an airport
package found by airport authorities to contain drugs. It was agreed that
the police action was in clear violation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Buhay214 that section 8 required a warrant in such circumstances. Buhay
had been handed down by the Supreme Court six weeks before this
police action in British Columbia. Justice Ryan (Lowry J.A. concurring)
found that the police had acted in good faith and admitted the evidence.

206

R. v. Kokesch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 117, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
208
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 60 (S.C.C.).
209
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 60 (S.C.C.).
210
“Annotation to F.D.” (2002) 8 C.R. (6th) 156 (Man. C.A.).
211
R. v. Kitaitchik, [2002] O.J. No. 2476, 4 C.R. (6th) 38, at para. 41 (Ont. C.A.), relying
on C. Hill. “The Role of Fault in Section 24(2) of the Charter” in J. Cameron, ed., The Charter’s
Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1996), at 57.
212
R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.).
213
R. v. Washington, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2394 (B.C.C.A.).
214
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
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Justice Rowles in dissent relied on Supreme Court dicta in Kokesch,215
Law216 and Buhay that good faith cannot be found where police made an
unreasonable error as to a Charter standard or were ignorant of it.
4. R. v. Grant: Dangers of Favouring Reliability over Rights
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision R. v. Grant217 points to the
dangers that a fully discretionary section 24(2) test may lead to far less
exclusion. Now that the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal this
may well be the case for full reconsideration of section 24(2) principles.
Justice Laskin decided for the Court that a young man stopped on
the street because he looked “suspicious” and asked questions about his
criminal record, had been psychologically detained to trigger and violate
the section 9 guarantee against arbitrary detention. The most significant
part of the judgment in Grant218 is the decision that, although the evidence
of the finding of a loaded gun was conscripted, it should not be excluded
under section 24(2).
Justice Laskin seizes on the concurring opinion of LeBel J. in
Orbanski219 to indicate that the Supreme Court no longer believes in an
automatic or near-automatic exclusion of conscripted evidence found
by a Charter breach and that all three Collins220 factors must always be
considered. Justice Laskin breaks new ground in deciding that it is
appropriate in conscripted cases to look at the degree of trial unfairness.
Given the reliability of the evidence and the nature of the police conduct,
here the impact on trial fairness was held to lie at the less serious end of
trial fairness. It seems odd that a judge can acknowledge that a trial is
even somewhat unfair and yet admit the evidence. The problem here is of
the Supreme Court’s making in their overinflated use of the phrase
“fairness of the trial” to reflect their often disputed view that Charter
breaches involving conscripting the accused against himself or herself
are always more serious than non-conscriptive Charter breaches.
In his analysis of trial fairness in this case and the second and third
Collins221 factors, Laskin J.A. emphasizes the factor of reliability of the
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

R. v. Kokesch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 117, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 29 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
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evidence. This focus is not apparent in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
rulings to exclude non-conscripted evidence of drugs in both Buhay222
and Mann,223 or in the Ontario Court of Appeal decisions by Doherty
J.A. to exclude in Simpson224 and Clayton.225 Justice Laskin contrasts
cases of statements obtained in violation of section 10(b) which, he
says, raise reliability issues.226 There is, however, a mountain of case law
excluding confessions for section 10(b) violations where it was clear the
statement was voluntary and therefore there was no issue of reliability.
An undue focus on reliability of the evidence and guilt will inevitably
substantially reduce Charter guarantees in place to protect both the
guilty and the innocent from unlawful State intrusion.227
According to Laskin J.A. there was no bad faith and no institutional
indifference to individual rights. Given that the Court decided that the
stop was in violation of Mann228 and section 9, and that such good faith
arguments were not accepted in Mann itself, this view is certainly of
doubtful authority. Justice Laskin also purports to distinguish Clayton229
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R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Clayton, [2005] O.J. No. 1078, 27 C.R. (5th) 197 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58, at para. 54 (Ont. C.A.).
227
In R. v. Davis-Harriot, [2007] O.J. No. 2481, 49 C.R. (6th) 265 (Ont. S.C.J.), Shaughnessy J.
found that the accused had been arrested for dangerous driving but had not been advised of his
s. 10(b) rights without delay. He refused to extend R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 45 C.R. (6th) 47
(Ont. C.A.) to this situation. There were no legitimate police safety concerns and the trial judge had
erred in relying on police training methods that conflicted with the Charter. He indicated he would
have excluded statements that there was a gun in the back seat but for the decision in R. v. Grant,
[2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.). Applying Grant, he admitted the statements.
There was no issue of reliability, no “flagrant abuse”, no use of force and no bad faith. In Hill J.’s
lengthy judgment in R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, 45 C.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.), Grant was
relied on to admit statements in a sexual predator case where the initial arrest at a school under the
provincial Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21 had been in breach of its provisions. In
R. v. Padavattan, [2007] O.J. No. 2003, 45 C.R. (6th) 405 (Ont. S.C.J.), Ducharme J. greeted Grant
with enthusiasm and admitted breathalyzer evidence on the basis that the Charter violation in
question had been technical. As a result of Grant, trial courts now apply a virtually automatic rule
of exclusion for guns found following a Charter violation: see R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290,
86 O.R. (3d) 730 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Beckford, [2007] O.J. No. 3065 (Ont. S.C.J.); and R. v. Ismail,
[2007] O.J. No. 3851 (Ont. S.C.J.). Prior to Grant, evidence of the finding of a gun was excluded
given multiple Charter breaches: R. v. Barrett, [2007] O.J. No. 3680 (Ont. S.C.J.). See too recently
R. v. Johnson, [2007] O.J. No. 5099 (Ont. S.C.J.), Spies J. In other contexts there has been some
resistance to Grant; see footnote 239.
228
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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on the basis that there was no evidence of “systemic or institutional
failure, or inadequate training”.230
When Clayton231 reached the Supreme Court, the nine justices found
no Charter violations, so they did not have to consider the decision to
exclude in the court below. However Abella J. for some reason found it
necessary to comment on Doherty J.A.’s conclusion that institutional
failures of the police to adequately train their officers significantly
aggravated the seriousness of the breach. Justice Abella said:
What is under constitutional scrutiny is the police conduct, not police
training. The officers’ good faith in carrying out their duties is the
issue in this case. To go further and examine the training behind such
conduct would risk transforming the inquiry into a protracted pedagogical
review of marginal relevance to whether the police conduct itself
represented a breach of sufficient severity to warrant excluding the
evidence.232

Yet, in the next paragraph, Abella J. acknowledges that there was no
doubt that police training is important. She was, however, of the view
that there was no evidence that the police were the subject of improper
training in answering gun calls. Justice Binnie agreed that lack of training
was not in issue in this case but he added that Doherty J.A. made an
important point. According to Binnie J.:
A Charter violation caused by systemic failure would raise greater
concerns for the administration of justice than an isolated act of a single
misguided police officer.233

Professor David Tanovich has expressed concern at the failure of
trial counsel in Grant234 and other cases to raise the issue of race. 235
Grant is black. In Grant, where there was no real light cast on why the
police thought Grant was acting suspiciously, the issue of systemic
racism ought to have been addressed at trial and may have affected the
analysis as to the violation and remedy.
230

R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58, at para. 63 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 51 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 129 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.).
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David Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 C.R. (6th) 84.
In R. v. L.B., [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 86 O.R. (3d) 730 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185,
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The general danger of the Grant236 decision is that focusing more on
reliability and seriousness of the offence will result in far less exclusion
of evidence found following Charter violations. This will considerably
diminish the importance of the Charter standards that the courts, and the
Supreme Court in particular, have been at pains to put in place since the
entrenchment of the Charter in 1982.
Commendably, there is resistance by some trial judges to Grant,237
especially at the level of the provincial courts where the vast majority of
criminal trials now occur.238 Judges at this level of immersion are in the
best position to know on a daily basis about whether Charter standards
are being applied and what remedy is warranted.
Consider the following two recent provincial court decisions 239
faced with police conduct showing, at best, indifference to Charter
standards.
In Nguyen,240 Lane J. held that section 10(b) right to counsel had
been breached. Police did not inform an accused of rights following
a roadside test demand where there was a reasonable opportunity of
consulting a lawyer during a 34-minute delay in administering the test.
His section 10(a) right to be informed of the reason for his arrest had also
been breached as the accused had not been advised as to the reason for
the administrative detention following the demand for a roadside test.
Justice Lane was fully aware of Grant241 and indeed applied it on
the issue of detention. But she held that in this case the evidence should
be excluded under section 24(2). The fairness of the trial was affected
by the 34-minute delay. The Charter breaches were serious. It was
disturbing that an experienced officer did not appreciate the Charter
rights involved. The breaches raised concerns about the quality of
236

R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.).
238
Cheryl Webster & Anthony Doob, “The Superior/Provincial Criminal Court Distinction:
Historical Anachronism or Empirical Reality?’ (2003) 48 Crim. L.Q. 77.
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See, too, decisions to exclude in R. v. Herter, [2006] A.J. No. 1058, 40 C.R. (6th) 349
(Alta. Prov. Ct.), revd [2007] A.J. No. 1498 (Alta. Q.B.) (motorist not advised of reason for
detention under s. 10(a) where this was easy to do and detained in “drunk tank” for eight hours
because he was uncooperative); R. v. Payne, [2006] N.J. No. 259, 41 C.R. (6th) 234 (N.L.S.C.
(T.D.)) (arrest of murder suspect and seizure of blood-stained clothing in violation of ss. 8 and 9
where police could reasonably have been expected to have knowledge of extent of powers); R. v.
Champion, [2007] O.J. No. 4180 (Ont. C.J.) (breathalyzer where s. 10(b) right to consult lawyer in
private breached); and R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 4305 (Ont. S.C.J.) (marijuana and crack
cocaine found by confronting a known drug dealer in the street in violation of ss. 8 and 9).
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R. v. Nguyen, [2007] O.J. No. 1201, 45 C.R. (6th) 276 (Ont. C.J.).
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R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 38 C.R. (6th) 58 (Ont. C.A.).
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education and training provided to OPP officers, and the extent to which
misunderstandings of section 10(a) and (b) rights might be a systemic
problem. They also raised concerns about the extent to which efficiency
and expediency prevail over fundamental Charter rights of detained
persons, especially those persons who are not taken into custody and
released at the scene. The admission of the evidence of the 34-minute
delay would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than
would the exclusion of the evidence.
Justice Lane concluded with strong words:
[T]he admission of the evidence of the 34-minute delay would bring
the administration of justice into greater disrepute than would the
exclusion of the evidence. To paraphrase my brother Brophy in R. v.
Wegener, [2006] O.J. No. 5280 at para. 54, not to exclude the evidence
would be to effectively say that s. 10(a) and (b) rights do not matter,
that police need not implement them, “because the drinking and driving
problem in our society is of such a nature that the Collins test will
allow you a free pass.” The courts, as guardians of process values, must
be vigilant to ensure that basic Charter rights are recognized and
implemented throughout the justice system. For the long-term good of
the system, I find that the evidence should be excluded. 242

In D. (J.)243 Jones J., sitting as a Youth Court judge, decided that a
stop of a youth late one cold night on a Toronto street for a CPIC check
as proactive policing in a high crime area constituted arbitrary detention
contrary to section 9. This did not meet the Mann244 requirement for
investigative detention of a reasonable ground to connect the person to a
specific crime.245 Section 8 had also been violated. Justice Jones decided
in no uncertain terms that the evidence against J.D. of a replica gun and
burglary tools found in violation of sections 8 and 9 should be excluded.
The evidence was conscripted and derived from conscripted evidence
not otherwise discoverable. Although the evidence of the weapon and
burglary tools was reliable, all the evidence had to be excluded because
242

R. v. Nguyen, [2007] O.J. No. 1201, 45 C.R. (6th) 276 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 50 (S.C.C.).
R. v. D. (J.), [2007] O.J. No. 1365, 45 C.R. (6th) 292 (Ont. C.J.). Earlier in R. v. V. (S.),
[2005] O.J. No. 4098, 32 C.R. (6th) 389 (Ont. C.J.), Cole J. identified institutional problems of
Toronto police not having received training as to the limits R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49,
21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) had imposed on their powers to question youth.
244
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
245
According to Jones J., there was no arbitrary detention of another youth stopped at the
same time because after the stop a police officer recognized him as one possibly out on a robbery
bail. It is difficult to see why this ex post facto reason for interest meant there was no s. 9 violation
in the stop in the case of that youth as well.
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the section 9 violation was wilful and serious. It arose in a context of
institutional indifference to individual rights. The blatant disregard for
Charter rights could only be the result of inadequate police training.
Proactive policing must not become a euphemism for institutionalized,
unconstitutional police conduct designed to remove undesirables from
the street in high crime areas. The Court had to be mindful of the
potential impact of proactive policing on the constitutional rights of
the indeterminate number of young people subjected to the same arbitrary
detention and questioning in the name of this police initiative.
In the course of her judgment, Jones J. quoted the view of Laforme J.,
now of our Ontario Court of Appeal, in Ferdinand (2004):246
It needs repeating once gain: stopping and investigating people merely
because of some “Spidey sense” being engaged goes far beyond the
standards our society demands and expects of our police. Young people
have the right to “just hang out” especially in their neighbourhood and
to move freely without fear of being detained and searched on a mere
whim, and without being advised of their rights, and without their consent.
Mere hunches do not give the police the grounds to “surprise” a group
of young people or to “get right on them” for investigative purposes
without something further that provides a lawful basis for doing so. 247

5. Reform Options
Only one justice of the Stillman248 court remains on the court ―
McLachlin C.J.C. It may well be that she will lead her Court to make it
clear that the factor of seriousness of the violation is the key and must
always be considered. Hopefully the newly composed Court will not
find favour with the lonely vision of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her dissent
in Burlingham.249 She advocated a return to a stress on the reliability of
evidence of guilt and a test that exclusion would be rare and only where
the community would be shocked. If she had had her way, years of careful
development of Charter rights for accused would have been reduced to
nothing significant.
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Michael Davies250 supports the earlier approach of the New Zealand
Court of Appeal in Goodwin251 which asserted the rights-centred approach
of prima facie exclusion even though New Zealand’s Bill of Rights252
has no express remedy of exclusion of evidence. A presumption of
exclusion was recently advocated by David Ormerod253 for British courts
interpreting European Convention of Human Rights provisions. The
wording of our section 24(2) is, however, based on a presumption of
admissibility, which appears to preclude any such approach being adopted
in Canada.
Professor Steven Penney254 may have the most intellectually honest
model in suggesting that the Supreme Court abandon the distinction
between conscripted and non-conscripted evidence, adopt the view that
deterrence is the only valid aim of exclusion and mandate a “bright
line rule mandating exclusion for all but reasonable, inadvertent
infringements”.255
James Stribopoulos,256 however, points to the shortfalls in the United
States jurisprudence in making deterrence the only goal of the exclusionary
rule. He sees a need to continue to maintain the goal of judicial integrity
in sanctioning unlawful police practices.
In contrast, Richard Fraser and Jennifer Addison257 go so far as to
suggest Parliament use the notwithstanding clause to stop the Supreme
Court excluding “reliable and pivotal evidence” under section 24(2).
Their exclusive focus on evidence of guilt is out of step with a system of
entrenched rights of those accused of crime and effective remedies for
breach, and the worldwide trend to recognize a discretion to exclude
evidence obtained by police in violation of declared standards. What of

250
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252
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.), 1990/109.
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the truth of abusive police practices? Does the State end always justify
the means?
6. Revise Criteria to Emphasize Seriousness of Breach as Key
The approach under section 24(2) should be discretionary in all cases
as the drafters of the Charter intended. For reasons expressed earlier, the
Supreme Court should abandon the distinction between conscripted and
non-conscripted evidence and the doctrine of discoverability.
It is one thing to call for a discretionary exercise, as section 24(2) was
clearly intended to be. However there are dangers in “proportionality”258
if this comes down to balancing the seriousness of the violation and the
seriousness of the offence. A criminal trial under an entrenched charter
of rights for accused has to concern itself with the truth of police abuse
and not just the truth of the guilt of the accused. Were the remedy of
exclusion to turn on the seriousness of the offence, the Charter will
cease to provide protection whenever the judge decides the offence is
serious, and in such cases the police end will always justify the means.
Charter standards for policing must be applied to all offences. There
cannot be a de facto two-tier system where one is a “Charter-free zone”.
Justice Berger of the Alberta Court of Appeal recently put this well
in his dissenting opinion in Calder:259
Section 24(2) of the Charter contemplates an analysis premised upon the
reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances
of the case. The Court is obliged to balance the community’s natural
condemnation of crime against Canadian society’s desire that our
fundamental rights and freedoms be upheld and that the police conduct
themselves in good faith. That balancing takes place regardless of
whether the crime is minor or serious. 260

The majority in Calder held that despite findings of serious police
misconduct contrary to the Charter, the evidence should be admitted
because the drug arrest at a public event attended by hundreds had led to
the discovery of a loaded rifle. Public safety concerns about firearms
overrode the findings of police misconduct. That view is similar to the
258
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on Sopinka J. in R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at 69-70 (S.C.C.) and
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ruling of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Grant261 and B. (L.).262 In B. (L.),
Moldaver J.A. did not have to consider section 24(2) since he found no
Charter violation. But he indicates that exclusion should only be for
egregious police behaviour and that “most Canadians” would not
countenance not having a trial on the merits for one found with a gun.
This is a test that exclusion should be rare and only when the community
would be shocked. In the Supreme Court, the only support for that position
lies in L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting opinion in Burlingham.263
The remedy of exclusion has proved to be an important vehicle to
hold agents of the State indirectly accountable and to seek to persuade
police to comply with Charter standards in future cases. The remedy of
exclusion will only be effective if there is in reality a real risk of exclusion.
Where there are patterns of inclusion despite police breaches, there will
be less incentive for police to take the Charter seriously. Those preferring
alternative remedies, such as civil suits and police complaints procedures,
now bear a heavy burden of demonstrating their comparative efficacy.
They have thus far proved to be a poor and low-visibility response to
systemic problems of police abuse or ignorance of their powers. Police
are rarely, if ever, disciplined for Charter breaches which uncover
evidence of criminality. Civil litigation is expensive, rarely successful264
and highly unlikely where the accused is in prison.265
261
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The Court should stand back and consider lessons from the previously
overwhelming trend to include non-conscripted evidence. It should
declare that the seriousness of the violation is the key factor and that
taking entrenched Charter rights for accused seriously requires the real
risk of exclusion of evidence obtained for serious violations of the
Charter even if the evidence is reliable and probative, and even if the
offence is serious. Consistent with its approach in Buhay266 to nonconscripted cases, the Supreme Court should declare that there must be
no automatic inclusion based on the fact that the evidence was reliable
and probative and/or essential to the Crown’s case.
In considering the section 24(2) remedy, courts must be concerned
with the long-term integrity of the justice system if Charter standards for
accused are ignored and/or operate unequally against vulnerable groups,
such as those of colour and young persons. There is certainly important
evidence in lower court rulings of systemic Charter disregard by the
police in their established proactive tactics invoked against youth and
persons of colour. The Charter is in place to try to ensure minorities are
fairly treated by the State.
The Supreme Court should state more clearly than it did in Buhay267
that a Charter breach will be considered serious where the police have
shown wilful or negligent disregard of those standards and that police
misperception or ignorance of Charter standards should only mitigate
the breach where they have shown due diligence in their attempt to
comply. The Court should disavow the utility of labels such as good or
bad faith or flagrant, which have proved troublesome.

VI. CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, the courts have done a reasonably good job in
setting out Charter standards for the police which try to balance civil
liberties and the need for effective police powers. They have, in general,
achieved a reasonable balance comparatively free of the law-and-order
politics that dominates Parliament.
The Charter as interpreted by our courts is certainly no panacea.
Sometimes the standards have been set too low. There are also
unmistakable signs of law and order interpretations creeping into Charter
jurisprudence and diminishing Charter standards. It has been suggested
266
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that the Supreme Court reconsider its approaches in a number of areas,
such as the triggering devices of “reasonable expectation of privacy” for
section 8 and “detention” for sections 9 and 10. The Court should revisit
the issue of section 10(b) and right to silence protections particularly
in the context of custodial interrogation. Perhaps, most importantly,
the Court should announce a revised set of criteria for the exclusion of
evidence under section 24(2) to make it clear that the seriousness of the
violation is determinative and not the reliability of the evidence or the
seriousness of the offence.
Hopefully, our courts and the new look Supreme Court in particular
will continue to be independent in asserting what Dickson C.J.C. saw as
the important role of “guardians of the Charter”. If so, in these times of
law and order and public security hype, our criminal justice system will
remain one which balances and respects minority rights of all Canadians,
including those of the accused.

